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THE SEC PREEMPTS THE ACCOUNTING
PRINCIPLES BOARD IN 1965: THE
CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED
TAX CREDIT RELATING TO
INSTALLMENT SALES
Abstract: In 1959, the Accounting Principles Board (APB) replaced the
Committee on Accounting Procedure because the latter was unable
to deal forthrightly with a series of important issues. But during the
APB’s first half-dozen years, its record of achievement was no more
impressive than its predecessor’s. The chairman of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), Manuel F. Cohen, criticized the APB’s
slow pace and unwillingness to tackle difficult issues. This article
discusses the circumstances attending the SEC’s issuance of an Accounting Series Release in late 1965 to demonstrate forcefully to the
APB that, when it is unable to carry out its responsibility to “narrow
the areas of difference” in accounting practice, the SEC is prepared
to step in and do so itself. In this sense, the article deals with the tensions between the private and public sectors in the establishment of
accounting principles in the U.S. during the mid-1960s. The article
makes extensive use of primary resource materials in the author’s
personal archive, which have not been used previously in published
work.

INTRODUCTION
In 1959, the American Institute of Certified Public Account
ants (Institute, AICPA) appointed a new body, the Accounting
Principles Board (APB), to succeed the Committee on Accounting Procedure (CAP). The APB had been charged to do a better
job than its predecessor in raising the standard of accounting
practice [see Zeff, 2001]. But the APB got off to a slow and uncertain start. In an embarrassing decision made in early 1962,
it rejected the recommendations of a research study it had
commissioned on broad accounting principles and shelved the
Acknowledgments: The author is grateful to Hugo Nurnberg, Sundaresh
Ramnath, and an anonymous reviewer for comments on an earlier draft, as well
as to Bill Coxsey and Travis Holt for services provided.
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study [see Moonitz, 1974, pp. 17-20]. In early 1963, the APB was
rebuffed by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
on the investment tax credit [see Moonitz, 1966]. Finally, in
1964-1966, the APB seemed poised to right its course. Foremost
among the reasons for this turn of events were (1) the decision
by the Institute’s executive committee to abandon its policy of
appointing only the strong-willed managing partners of the Big
Eight accounting firms to the board, and (2) the decision by the
new board chairman, Clifford V. Heimbucher, a past president of
the Institute and a partner in a small San Francisco CPA firm, to
organize the board’s work more effectively [Carey, 1970, pp. 130132]. These were administrative improvements of considerable
importance.
But there was a third reason – the increasing public pressure from the activist chairman of the SEC, Manuel F. Cohen.
In a series of speeches, he urged the APB to make the difficult
decisions so as to “narrow the areas of difference and inconsistency in practice,” which the CAP had set as one of its objectives
in 1953, and which had been laid down as an objective for the
APB by the Institute’s Special Committee on Research Program
in 1958 [“Report to Council of the Special Committee . . . ,” 1958,
pp. 62-63].
In 1965, the APB was drafting an Opinion on the status of
the CAP’s Accounting Research Bulletins. In its exposure draft,
it proposed to classify the deferred tax credit as a current liability when it relates to installment sales receivables shown
as a current asset. Then the board recanted its position, greatly
annoying one of its supporters, Arthur Andersen & Co. (AA). In
late 1965, AA petitioned the SEC to require its classification as a
current liability, thus overruling the APB. Manuel Cohen seized
upon the petition as an opportunity to lecture a delegation from
the APB at a specially called meeting of the Commission and
then to issue an Accounting Series Release on the deferred tax
classification as requested by AA. It was unprecedented for the
SEC to issue a rule on accounting recognition, measurement,
or classification in an area in which the accounting profession

had declined to act after having initially undertaken to do so.
This action by the SEC has been little noticed in the literature

To be sure, the SEC’s accounting staff had exerted its influence on the CAP
and the APB in other ways. The only comparable confrontation between the
standard setter and the SEC on income tax allocation occurred in 1945, when
the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 53 [SEC, 1945] in order to limit the
applicability of ARB No. 23 [CAP, 1944].
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[cf. see Pines, 1965, pp. 739-740; Defliese, 1974, p. 39], and
there is some evidence to suggest that the SEC’s release was a
factor contributing to the APB’s greater inclination to address
difficult questions head-on in 1966-1967, especially on pensions
and income tax allocation. In its later years, however, the APB
foundered once again, in particular on accounting for business
combinations [see Chatov, 1975, chap. 14; Seligman, 2003, pp.
418-430]. In 1973, the APB was succeeded by the independent
Financial Accounting Standards Board. It is the purpose of this
paper to examine in some depth this unique intervention by the
SEC in the process by which the profession established accounting principles in the mid-1960s.
BACKGROUND
When the APB was established in 1959, the Institute’s executive committee, probably at the behest of President Louis H.
Penney, decided that only managing partners would be invited

to represent the Big Eight firms on the board. The executive
committee apparently believed that the board would be making broad policy decisions based on technical support from its
research staff, and that the managing partners were the most
suited to making such executive decisions. But it quickly became evident that the board could not avoid immersing itself
in highly technical issues. It also became clear that a number
of the managing partners were not technical specialists, did
not always read their agenda materials prior to the meetings,
were typically men of strong conviction, and, thus, did not work
easily together during the board’s early years. Also, the board
exhausted itself in lengthy debates leading up to Opinion Nos. 2
and 4 [APB, 1962, 1964] on the investment tax credit, on which
a total of 11 members dissented and a further nine filed qualified assents. Further, the board expended considerable time and
energy on the controversial research study on accounting principles [Sprouse and Moonitz, 1962] and on a recommendation to
Council on the authority that the board should be given to make
changes in “generally accepted accounting principles” (GAAP)
[Zeff, 1972, pp. 180-182].
By 1964, it became clear to the Institute’s executive committee that its policy on managing partners had been a mistake,

The lone exception was Weldon Powell, the senior technical partner of
Haskins & Sells. Powell had chaired the special committee that called for establishment of the APB and the new accounting research division to provide the
board with technical support.
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and it proceeded to appoint the Big Eight firms’ senior technical
partners as the terms of their firms’ managing partners expired
[see Zeff, 1972, p. 193]. (It was always the Institute’s unstated
policy to have one representative on the board from each Big
Eight firm.) By 1966, all but one of the managing partners of
the Big Eight firms had departed the board. The lone exception
was John W. Queenan, who had succeeded Weldon Powell as
the representative of Haskins & Sells in 1963. But Queenan had
served on the CAP from 1949 to 1954 and was strongly interested in technical accounting issues.
When Heimbucher became chairman of the board in 1964,
he established subject-area subcommittees to study and draft
Opinions. Previously, the board itself had done the drafting in
plenum. Also, he arranged for an administrative staff to circularize exposure drafts and to read and analyze the letters of comment, thus freeing up time for the accounting research staff to
concentrate on research. In addition, he set up a planning committee to set priorities and target dates for the board’s agenda of
projects. Finally, he allowed board members to bring an adviser
to board meetings [see Heimbucher, 1966].
All the while, the board was being criticized in the financial
press, in speeches by Leonard Spacek, the outspoken and feisty
managing partner of AA, and by SEC Chairman Cohen. The issue coming in for the greatest attention was over “uniformity” v.
“flexibility” when companies made choices of accounting principles, including the consequent diversity of accounting practice. Spacek spoke in favor of greater uniformity, while several
other large firms, such as Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins
& Sells, defended flexibility in the choice of accounting princi
ples. The SEC was on record for many years as favoring greater
uniformity, and, in a speech in late 1964, Cohen [1964, p. 12]
became more insistent that decisive progress be made in that direction. He said that “an immediate and pressing objective is to
eliminate the use of alternative accounting principles underlying
financial statements not justified by differing circumstances.”
During its first 5½ years, by the end of 1964, the APB had issued
only five Opinions, and none had had the effect of narrowing ac
cepted practice.

See the symposium, “Uniformity in Financial Accounting” [1965], for papers by Spacek, Weldon Powell, J. Arnold Pines (of the SEC staff), and others.
For the Price Waterhouse view, see Bevis [1965] and Grady [1965, pp. 32-34].

It was not for lack of trying, however. In Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962], a
divided board tried mightily to limit to one the number of ways to account for
the investment tax credit. But the SEC was lobbied into allowing an alternative
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WHY THE CLASSIFICATION OF THE DEFERRED TAX
CREDIT BECAME IMPORTANT TO SPACEK
AND ANDERSEN IN 1965
It was in this roiling environment that Leonard Spacek and
AA became concerned about the diversity of practice allowed for
treating the deferred tax credit arising from retailers’ use of the
installment method for recognizing gross income for income tax
purposes coincident with recording sales revenue for financial
reporting purposes as soon as an installment sale was made. Retailers, especially the department stores and mail-order houses,
were the industry most significantly marked by this diversity of
practice. The majority of companies had been classifying the
deferred tax credit as a noncurrent liability. A few were displaying it as a current liability. Some companies had deducted the
deferred tax credit from the installment receivables [see Hicks,
1966, p. 130].
Norman O. Olson [1966, p. 60], a partner in AA’s executive
office, explained why the deferred tax credit was becoming of
increasing importance to companies in the retail industry. Referring to the divergence in practice between its classification as
current or noncurrent, he wrote:
The effect of this divergence in practice was assuming greatly increased significance by 1965, and it was
likely to increase even further. With the expanded use
of revolving credit plans and various other installment
payment plans by merchandising companies and with
the relatively recent regulations of the Internal Revenue
Service permitting sales under revolving credit plans to
be treated as installment sales for income tax purposes,
many companies were accumulating an increasingly
large amount of deferred income taxes on installment
sales.
Olson added that the classification of deferred tax “has a significant effect on the determination of a company’s working capital
and the credit rating it receives.”
The classification of the deferred tax credit became an important issue to Spacek and AA in early 1965, when the president of one of its major retail clients, Montgomery Ward & Co.,
Incorporated (MW) complained about having to show its credit
method, and, in Opinion No. 4 [APB, 1964], the board reluctantly conceded defeat. This rebuff of the board by the SEC provoked considerable comment in the
press.
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as a current liability in its 1964-1965 financial statements (fiscal year ending on February 3, 1965). In line with a position
which it had recently announced, AA [1962, pp. 66-67] insisted
that MW classify its deferred tax credit as a current liability. The
current portion of the deferred tax credit balance in its balance
sheet dated February 3, 1965 was $3.9m, which represented
1.8% of its total current liabilities excluding the credit, but the
president surely knew in early 1965 that this percentage would
increase steeply in the years ahead. (It did indeed rise to 6.5%
by February 2, 1966 and to 9.7% a year later.) Sears, Roebuck
and Co., a much larger retail company, also based in Chicago,
and audited by Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart, had been displaying its deferred tax credit as noncurrent. The balance of Sears’
deferred tax credit on January 31, 1965, the end of its fiscal year,
was $454m, equal to one-third of its total current liabilities on

that date. MW’s president wanted to know why his company
should be penalized for carrying the credit as a current liability
while most other major retailers were not. Spacek agreed that
his company should not be penalized, and he offered him a deal.
If MW would agree to show the credit as a current liability in its
1964-1965 financial statements, and if Spacek could not get the
APB to call for a uniform classification of the credit as a current
liability by the end of 1965, he would approve of MW’s adoption
of noncurrent treatment in its 1965-1966 financial statements.

MW’s president agreed to the deal.
SPACEK’S EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE APB
TO ACT ON DEFERRED TAXES
Previously, the CAP had dealt with the tax effect of a timing difference between reporting accelerated depreciation for
income tax purposes and recording straight-line depreciation
expense for financial reporting purposes (Accounting Research

Neither MW nor Sears disclosed the current portion of its deferred tax
credit, that is, the portion relating to installment receivables shown as current
assets, in their 1965 year-end annual reports. Yet both companies had to break
down their deferred tax credit account into its current and noncurrent components in their February 2, 1966/January 31, 1966 balance sheets, owing to the
dictum in Accounting Series Release No. 102 [SEC, 1965] (see below). They were
also obliged to give, which they did, the comparative current/noncurrent breakdown for the previous year’s balance sheet. As will be seen, the SEC release dealt
with the classification of the deferred tax credit only in relation to installment
receivables shown as current assets.

This anecdote is recounted in interviews with George R. Catlett, September
3, 1970 and May 3, 1978.
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Bulletin [ARB] No. 44 Revised) [CAP, 1958]. It had recommended
that, except in special circumstances, such differences should
be accounted for as deferred taxes. The CAP announced in 1959
that the deferred tax credit account relating to the depreciation
differential should be shown in the balance sheet as a liability
or deferred credit, not as part of equity capital [CAP, 1959]. As
far back as 1944, the CAP had recommended that a provision
should be made for the estimated tax to be paid on installment
sales which were deferred for income tax purposes (ARB No. 23,
final paragraph) [CAP, 1944]. The CAP reaffirmed this position
in paragraph 18 of Chapter 10B of ARB No. 43 [CAP, 1953]. But
the CAP did not say how to classify the deferred tax credit account. In the retail field, as indicated, there was a lack of agreement whether the deferred tax credit should be shown as a current or noncurrent liability when the installment sales receivable
was shown as a current asset.
During 1964-1965, the APB was deliberating a pronouncement, which became Opinion No. 6 issued in October 1965, in
which it was to announce which of the CAP’s Accounting Research Bulletins should be continued without amendment and

which should either be revised or be withdrawn entirely. All of
the board members, as well as Andrew Barr, the SEC chief accountant, were invited by Chairman Heimbucher to give their
views on which of the ARBs should be retained, in their original
form or as amended. In a letter dated May 26, 1965, Leonard
Spacek, who was in his last year of service on the board, replied
that the definition of current liabilities in ARB No. 43, Chapter
3A, paragraph 7 [CAP, 1953] should be amended to include deferred taxes to the extent that they relate to current assets, such
as the current portion of installment sales receivable. It was
expected that much of the impact of this amendment would be

on retailers. On June 4, 1965, Andrew Barr replied at length to

The board’s review of the ARBs became necessary after the AICPA Council
decided in October 1964 that any departures in company financial statements
from accounting principles accepted in the board’s Opinions and in the ARBs
had to be disclosed either in the footnotes or in the auditor’s report, effective
with financial statements for fiscal periods beginning after December 31, 1965.
The board, therefore, had to determine which of the contents of the ARBs, with
or without amendment, were to serve as this benchmark.

The references to board correspondence and board minutes are drawn from
files that AA generously allowed the author to copy during the summers of 1982
and 1983 in the firm’s Chicago executive office, at the invitation of Arthur R.
Wyatt. Documents have been obtained from other sources as well. Researchers
interested in pursuing the issue raised in this article are invited to inspect copies
of the related documents in the author’s personal archive.
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Heimbucher’s invitation, and, among other things, stated that
“Paragraph 7 [of ARB No. 43, Chapter 3A] should be expanded
to specifically state that liabilities maturing in the time period
of the operating cycle should be included in current liabilities,
such as liabilities related to installment receivables and deferred
income taxes on installment sales.”
Spacek sought the view of Anson Herrick, a retired San
Francisco practitioner who, as a member of the CAP in the
1940s, had drafted ARB No. 30, “Current Assets and Current
Liabilities – Working Capital” [CAP, 1947], which served as the
basis for Chapter 3A of ARB No. 43. Herrick replied that he supported the proposed classification of the deferred tax credit as a
current liability in such circumstances. He said that “[the classi
fication] is completely consistent with the cycle theory which I

originated.”
In 1953, no less an authority than Carman G. Blough, the
Institute’s director of research, who attended the meetings of the
CAP, had opined that the deferred tax credit relating to installment receivables should be shown as a current liability in line
with ARB No. 30 [Blough, 1953, p. 347].
SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] was later to say that,
in 1965, “no fewer than four different reporting methods were
used by companies for which the [deferred tax] item was of
considerable importance. . . . Significantly, each method carried
the opinion of an independent public accountant reporting that
the financial statements had been prepared in accordance with
generally accepted accounting principles.” Clearly, a uniform ap10
proach was lacking.
At its meeting on June 21-23, 1965, the APB unanimously
approved Spacek’s proposed amendment of paragraph 7, and it
was duly included in the board’s exposure draft that was issued
11
in July [“Exposure Draft of Tentative Opinion . . . ,” 1965]. The
draft was widely circulated, including a special mailing to the
presidents of the some 1,300 companies listed on the New York
Stock Exchange. The pertinent passage in the exposure draft
appeared in paragraph 13. In that paragraph, it was stated that
the AICPA’s accounting research division will conduct a research
study on current assets and liabilities, and that, “[p]ending
completion of this study, and publication of a Board Opinion
letter from Herrick to Spacek, dated June 17, 1965
This matter was also discussed at length by Rappaport [1972, pp. 3-7 to
3-10].
11
AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, June 21-23, 1965, p. 1
 

10
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thereon,” the following paragraph was to be added to Chapter
3A (p. 58):
10. Whenever it is appropriate to record deferred income taxes, such deferred taxes should be classified as
a current liability in the balance sheet to the extent that
they are related to current assets which give rise to the
tax deferment.
As can be seen, the proposed change was solely one of balancesheet classification, and it was to be reconsidered once the board
could review the research study on current assets and liabilities.
The provision did not pretend to impose tax allocation accounting (today known as deferred tax accounting) where it had other
wise not been recommended by the CAP or the APB. Indeed,
the APB was then considering whether to pronounce in favor or
against tax allocation generally, and two of the Big Eight firms
(Price Waterhouse & Co. and Haskins & Sells) had already registered antipathy, or at least profound skepticism, toward any tax
allocation at all. AA was the Big Eight firm that was the strong
est advocate of tax allocation.
During the board’s June meeting, George R. Catlett succeeded Spacek as AA’s representative on the board. He later
recalled that board member Ira Schur of S.D. Leidesdorf & Co.,
a middle-sized firm based in New York City, said that his firm
had been trying to persuade City Stores, one of its clients, to
reclassify its deferred tax liability relating to installment receivables as current but had been unable to do so because of the
noncurrent classification used by most other companies in the
industry. He also recalled that board member Donald J. Bevis of
Touche, Ross, Bailey & Smart said that he had always favored
the current classification for the deferred tax credit relating to
12
installment sales. Touche, Ross, the auditor of Sears, was then
the predominant Big Eight firm with major clients in retail trade
– department stores, mail-order houses, etc. [see Zeff and Fossum, 1967, p. 317].
Key commentators on the exposure draft expressed reservations or outright opposition to paragraph 13 on the current classification. The Panel on Accounting Principles of the Financial
Executives Institute argued that the paragraph prejudged the
research study on current assets and liabilities still under way

12
internal AA memorandum from George R. Catlett to partners R.I. Jones,
W.J. Mueller, J.J. Brice, and J.W. Boyle, dated July 1, 1965
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by the board’s research staff. Awaiting the results of research
has always been an easy argument to make against unwelcome
changes in accounting principles. The Retail Committee on
Accounting Principles of the National Retail Merchants Association (NRMA), representing 15 major department stores
and mail-order houses (including MW, Sears, and City Stores),
objected to the reclassification. It argued that only income taxes
payable during the current year should be shown as current:
“The deferred income taxes of retailers arising out of the installment method of tax accounting are, in effect, a long-term obligation which is not payable until the outstanding receivables are
14
liquidated – a very remote possibility in a going business.”
Of the 15 companies represented on the NRMA’s accounting
principles committee (apart from MW and Sears), five had balances in their deferred tax credit account relating to installment
receivables that were equal to or exceeded 15% of their total
current liabilities, excluding the credit, at the end of their 19641965 fiscal years: J.C. Penney Company, Inc. (16.8%), BroadwayHale Stores, Inc. (18.8%), May Department Stores Company
(20.3%), Miller & Rhoads, Inc. (48.9%), and Rich’s Inc. (50.6%) .
Five of the other companies disclosed that they had balances of
less than 15%, while no information is available for the remain15
ing three companies.
One reason why retail companies objected to the current
classification of the deferred tax credit was that it did not represent a current claim on liquid assets and, thus, would give a
misleading impression of a retailer’s ability to meet its financial
obligations. It would also place such companies in an awkward
position because of the working capital requirements stipulated
16
in their bond indentures.
In correspondence among board members following issuance of the exposure draft, the two Big Eight firms that were
known to be unsympathetic toward tax allocation, mentioned
13

13
letter from J.R. Janssen, chairman of the Panel, to Richard C. Lytle (APB
administrative director), dated September 15, 1965
14
letter from K.S. Axelson, chairman of the committee, to Richard C. Lytle,
dated September 15, 1965
15
These percentages were developed from ProQuest’s Historical Annual
Reports service and from Moody’s Industrials for the year 1966. Because of the
unavailability of the other three companies’ annual reports and their omission
from Moody’s Industrials, it was impossible to determine how much of the balances in their deferred tax credit account, if any, was attributable to installment
receivables.
16
letter from Malise L. Graham, of the New York law firm of Faulkner,
Dawkins & Sullivan, to William D. Hall, a partner of AA, dated March 30, 1966
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above, made known their disagreement with paragraph 13. In
retrospect, it is surprising that they assented to the provision
during the June meeting of the board. Board member Herman
W. Bevis, the senior partner of Price Waterhouse, recommended that the paragraph be deleted, as it was not clear, he said,
whether the deferred tax credit was a liability at all, even though
it must be shown on the liability side of the balance sheet. He
17
believed that it was, in essence, only a contingency. Bevis said
he had canvassed his partners for their views, and it seems likely
that his partners had in turn canvassed the views of their retail
clients. Haskins & Sells submitted a memorandum in which it
also opposed the provision, as it believed that the amount might
never fall due. The firm said that the balance in the deferred tax
credit account might constantly grow and, thus, may never mature as an amount to be paid. The firm conceded that it would
be more theoretically defensible to classify the deferred tax
as a current liability if it were expected to mature within one
year from the balance sheet date. The firm also argued that the
board’s proposed reclassification goes beyond prevailing practice. Furthermore, it said, any such recommendation should
await completion of the research studies on current assets and
18
liabilities and on tax allocation accounting. Letters submitted
by the board members from Ernst & Ernst (E&E) and Lybrand,
Ross Bros. & Montgomery (LRB&M), which were two of the
other Big Eight firms, did not mention the proposed reclassifica19
tion in paragraph 13.
At the board’s next meeting, on September 16-17, 1965, it reversed its unanimous approval of paragraph 13. The board voted
14-2 to delete the provision on the classification of deferred tax
“on the condition that a subcommittee would be appointed to
20
consider the subject.” It was the only item in the exposure draft
that the board deleted in its entirety [Lytle, 1965, p. 72]. George
Catlett “objected strenuously to deferring this question” [Olson,
1966, p. 61]. Richard C. Lytle [1965, p. 72], the board’s administrative director, gave the following reasons for the board’s action:
17
letter from Herman W. Bevis to Reed K. Storey (AICPA director of accounting research), dated August 9, 1965
18
memorandum attached to the letter from Oscar S. Gellein to Richard C.
Lytle, dated September 10, 1965
19
letters from Hassel Tippit (E&E) to Richard C. Lytle, dated July 20, 1965,
and from Philip L. Defliese (LRB&M) to members of the APB, dated September
13, 1965
20
AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, September 16-17, 1965, p. 4.

Published by eGrove, 2007

11

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2
12

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2007

Unlike other changes proposed in the exposure
draft, this paragraph was directed to a matter not specifically covered in the ARBs and its inclusion would
have been consistent with what appears to be the more
predominant accepted practice currently.
He added that it could have “important implications with regard
to the broad area of accounting for income taxes,” a subject on
which a research study was being completed (which had been
in preparation since 1961). One major question, he said, was
“whether deferred income taxes are a ‘deferred credit’ or a ‘liability’.” This last point, which had been debated for years, was
probably significant in crippling the effort to classify the deferred tax, if only in defined circumstances, as a current liability.
In its Executive Letter to partners and managers, Price Waterhouse said: “The APB decided to omit the [reclassification]
requirement from Opinion No. 6 largely because it was out of
context with an opinion having the avowed purpose of revising
existing pronouncements in order to ‘obviate conflicts between
present accepted practice and provisions of outstanding Bulletins’” [“Special Bulletin . . . ,” 1965, p. 4].
AA’s Catlett was convinced that the reversal was a clear result of client pressure brought on the firms, whose board repre
sentatives had not realized in June how large the impact of the
21
reclassification might be on their clients’ balance sheets. Not
surprisingly, the paragraph had met with considerable opposition from retail industry commentators on the exposure draft,
including a number of major companies, such as BroadwayHale Stores, Sears, Spiegel, and MW, which wrote separate let22
ters apart from the letter from the NRMA. Many of those opposing the paragraph on classifying deferred tax criticized the
precedent of linking an item on the liability side of the balance
sheet with one or more classes of assets; instead, they believed
that the deferred tax should be classified according to when it
will be liquidated. Others questioned whether the deferred tax
would ever actually be paid, and, thus, they saw no ground for
requiring that it reduce working capital. Some said that the
reclassification went beyond the scope of the pronouncement,
which was to determine which pre-existing positions in the
ARBs were to be regarded as still in force. Opinion No. 6, “Status
of Accounting Research Bulletins,” was published in October
interview with George R. Catlett, May 3, 1978
These separate letters were in the batches of comment letters conveyed to
the board by Richard Lytle.
21
22
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1965 and reproduced in the November issue of the Journal of
Accountancy.
AA PETITIONS THE SEC
On October 1, 1965, two weeks after the board meeting
at which paragraph 13 was deleted, AA petitioned the SEC to
issue an Accounting Series Release (ASR) that would classify
the deferred tax arising from current assets such as installment
sales receivable as a current liability. AA knew, of course, that
SEC Chief Accountant Andrew Barr had advised the APB that
he favored such a classification. And, as mentioned above, SEC
Chairman Cohen had been railing against the diversity in accounting practice. The firm had reason to believe that the SEC
might be sympathetic to its cause. Yet it privately harbored
23
doubts that the SEC would act favorably on its petition.
As was the SEC’s practice in such matters, AA’s petition was
held in confidence, except that Barr notified Richard Lytle, at the
board, that AA had filed the petition. Barr inquired if the board
might be able to act on the deferred classification by November
15, which was viewed as the deadline for the SEC to publish a
proposed accounting rule that, after a 30-day exposure period,
could be adopted in time to apply to financial statements ending
on or before December 31. At Lytle’s request, and with the acquiescence of Barr, AA provided the APB with a copy of the petition
for confidential circulation to the board members. The board’s
planning subcommittee met on October 22. It concluded that
the subject was too complex for the board to be able to act on
the matter by the end of 1965.
Contrary to what some might have expected, namely, that
AA would publicize its petition to vaunt the role it was playing to
achieve greater uniformity in financial reporting, the firm rarely
mentioned its authorship of the petition in its publications, and
24
only well after the event. Chief Accountant Barr had advised AA
that the Commission would prefer that the firm not publicize the
25
petition until it was acted upon, and the firm complied.

interview with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970
The only two mentions the author has found are in Olson [1966, p. 61]
and AA [1969, p. 67]. Spacek did not mention the petition in his speeches. The
author can find no other mentions in the literature of AA being the source of the
petition. Cohen [1966, p. 59] said that “a leading accounting firm” had petitioned
the SEC but did not name the firm.
25
interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
23
24

Published by eGrove, 2007

13

Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 34 [2007], Iss. 1, Art. 2
14

Accounting Historians Journal, June 2007

THE SEC CONFERS WITH A DELEGATION
FROM THE APB
In November 1965, the SEC invited the APB to send a delegation to meet with the five members of the Commission to
discuss the AA petition. The four members of the APB’s planning committee, composed of Chairman Clifford Heimbucher,
Herman Bevis (Price Waterhouse and APB vice chairman),
John Queenan (Haskins & Sells), and Frank T. Weston (Arthur
Young & Company), accompanied by two senior staff members,
attended the conference. All four of the APB members in attend
ance were practitioners who were held in high regard for their
serious dedication to the development of accounting principles.
The hour-long meeting was held in the SEC’s offices in Washington on November 22. SEC Chairman Cohen presided, and Chief
26
Accountant Barr attended. It was one of the rare occasions on
which the Commission met formally with members of the APB,
and it was rarer still for such a meeting to be recorded on a
27
stenographic transcript. In his prepared remarks, Cohen made
it known that the Commission’s staff had “as early as August,
1950 recommended to a committee of the American Institute
of Accountants to take a firm position” (p. 3) in the matter of
the classification of deferred tax in such cases. He added: “The
increasing incidence of these practices and the growing significance of the amounts involved convince us that the petition is
right in urging us to act now rather than to tolerate further delay
which your procedures would seem to require” (p. 3).
Cohen quoted from the AA petition as follows:
Some companies which have heretofore included
the deferred taxes in current liabilities have changed
the classification to noncurrent liabilities. Other companies (some of which are our clients) are now taking
the position that they will change the classification to
noncurrent at the end of the current fiscal year if other
companies are permitted to continue the noncurrent
classification. This represents a retrogression in ac26
“In the Matter of Conference with Representatives of the Accounting
Principles Board re: Arthur Andersen & Co. Petition,” Official Transcript of Proceedings before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D.C.,
November 22, 1965 (ACE-Federal Reporters, Inc, Official Reporters). Quotations
from this transcript will be indicated by page number.
27
On December 21, 1962, following issuance of the board’s controversial
Opinion No. 2 [APB, 1962] on the investment tax credit, a delegation from the
board met in Washington with four SEC Commissioners and several SEC staff
members, but, as far as is known, no transcript was prepared.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/2

14

empts the Accounting Principles Board in 1965: The classification of the deferred tax credit relating to inst
Zeff: SEC Preempts APB

15

counting which occurs when such alternative practices
exist.
Cohen stated that the SEC’s staff had already drafted a proposed
release that would effectuate the AA petition, but that, before
issuing the release, the Commission wanted to have the benefit
of hearing the comments of the APB’s delegation. And then he
bluntly expressed his unhappiness with the board’s performance
and issued a thinly veiled threat (pp. 4-5):
. . . before we hear your comments I do want to take this
opportunity to observe that this Commission, as you
know, has been quite patient with the efforts of the accounting profession to solve a number of accounting
matters as to which questionable alternative solutions
have been accepted for some time. I am sure you are
aware that, we and important persons in other parts
of Washington, hear and receive many complaints that
the profession seems unable to come to grips with the
problems and to adopt solutions, even though extensive
studies have been made and published.
As you know, we have certain statutory responsibilities. It has been suggested strongly that if you cannot or will not move with reasonable dispatch to cope
with these issues, we should. Now, while our patience
has not been exhausted and we believe that cooperation with the Board has been most helpful and should
continue, I wish to make the point that we do have a
responsibility and that we do have to account for it.
In reply, Heimbucher stated that the board’s decision to
drop the paragraph on deferred tax from Opinion No. 6 [APB,
1965] was that it had become controversial and that the pronouncement had to be issued with dispatch. He added that
“some of those who voted to remove it from the bulletin at that
time did so on the condition that a committee of the Board be
appointed immediately to deal forthwith with this question” (p.
8). He said that he expected a three-man committee to report
in time for the board’s next meeting, in December, “and it is
our earnest belief that we will be able to reach a conclusion on
this during 1966, allowing for all of our exposure requirements,
which take two or three months, and then a final ballot on the
draft” (p. 9). Heimbucher hoped to persuade the SEC not to
issue its release. Cohen then reminded the board members that
the issue concerning the Commission is a larger one, namely,
that “the profession finds great difficulty in arriving at solutions
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to problems which, albeit difficult, nevertheless appear to be
subject to solution” (p. 10).
Herman Bevis pointed out that “these questions are far
more difficult and far more complex than those you can state in
rather simple form, and I myself believe, and I think you would
agree, that what we are looking for is not just any solution which
can’t stand up in trial very long. We are looking for sound solutions” (p. 11). Cohen replied that he shared Bevis’ view, but “as
I pointed out this problem was addressed with a certain amount
of conviction by our Chief Accountant 15 years ago, and I would
think anyone would agree that is a reasonable period within
which to find a solution” (p. 11).
John Queenan emphasized that the APB’s program of research studies was now coming to the stage where the board
will become more active in issuing Opinions. On the matter of
income tax allocation, he said that he was one of those who did
not consider it as a liability. To have approved the deferred tax as
a current liability in some cases would, he said, have prejudged
the outcome of the research study on tax allocation accounting
that was still in preparation. Queenan also doubted that it was
as urgent a matter as AA had argued, as he believed that the
predominant practice was to show the deferred tax “outside of
current [liabilities]” and that there are relatively few companies
showing it as current. Hence, he implied, there would be few occasions for switchovers.
Chairman Cohen said he had no reason to question that the
board could resolve the issue in 1966, but “I don’t know how
your resolution will come out. . . . ” (p. 18). It was clear to everyone that the Commission had made up its mind on the matter.
Herman Bevis, who was no more sympathetic with the
current liability classification than was Queenan, proceeded to
argue a point that could be described as reductio ad absurdum.
He cited Spiegel Co., which showed $120m of long-term debt
and only $30m of noncurrent assets. He then proposed that,
if the deferred tax associated with installment receivables (a
current asset) should be shown as a current liability, “it immediately raises the question of whether 90 of the 120 million of
the long-term debt shouldn’t also go up there, because it has to
28
apply to something on the current asset side” (p. 19). Chairman
Cohen dismissed the argument peremptorily, as if everything

This same point was made by a number of commentators on the exposure

28

draft.

https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol34/iss1/2

16

empts the Accounting Principles Board in 1965: The classification of the deferred tax credit relating to inst
Zeff: SEC Preempts APB

17

on the right side of the balance sheet should be linked to everything on the left side. This strained argument by Bevis could
not have  given Cohen confidence in the board’s ability to solve
the deferred tax problem. Then Bevis argued that most of the
companies that show the deferred tax as a noncurrent item are
the ones where the amount is the most significant, while those
that show it as a current liability claim only small amounts, as
if to suggest that the issue is not all that important. Amused at
Bevis’ analysis, Chairman Cohen interjected, “May I partially in
jest – I hope it will be so understood – say that I draw from what
has been said that where the amount is not material and really
can’t affect the current ratio very much they assign it to the current section, but where it is material and could affect the current
ratio it is assigned elsewhere. Is that too unfair a suggestion?”
(pp. 21-22). Bevis was not able to disagree with this reconstruction of his argument as an opportunity for manipulation.
Cohen then ventured the view that the Commission’s draft
release, being an interpretation of existing requirements, could
be issued forthwith, without any prior exposure. He said he
was interested in issuing the release in time to affect financial
statements for the year ending December 31, 1965. Cohen also
expressed exasperation with the board’s process: “there ought to
be an end to all the studies and all the committees that review
the work of prior committees, and someone ought to decide
something” (p. 25).
In the course of the discussion, Heimbucher and Weston
said they would classify deferred tax as a liability, while Queenan and Bevis had taken the other side. These matched pairs
could not have filled Chairman Cohen with confidence that the
board would successfully resolve the issue, even in 1966.
At the end of the meeting, Heimbucher and Weston urged
the Commission not to act in a way that would reflect unfavorably on the standing of the board, and Cohen expressed sym
pathy with their view. In fact, in a speech delivered eight days
later, he was reassuring on this point. Cohen [1965, p. 11] said:
We are now considering some limited action of our
own [on accounting] – action which is not designed to
undermine the efforts of the leaders of the profession
but rather to emphasize to the entire profession the
urgency of immediate and effective support of those
who are seeking sound procedures to obviate unjustified
differences in the treatment and presentation of similar
problems.
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THE SEC ISSUES ACCOUNTING SERIES
RELEASE NO. 102
On December 7, 1965, the day before the next APB meeting, the SEC issued Accounting Series Release No. 102, “Balance
Sheet Classification of Deferred Income Taxes Arising from In29
stallment Sales.” In the release, the Commission said: ”Where
installment receivables are classified as current assets in accordance with the operating cycle practice [citing ARB No. 43,
Chapter 3A], the related liabilities or credit items maturing or
expiring in the time period of the operating cycle, including the
deferred income taxes on installment sales, should be classified
as current liabilities.” The SEC made no mention in the release
of AA’s petition or of the fact that the matter had been under
study by the APB.
Although AA had asked in its petition that the rule take effect for fiscal years beginning after December 31, 1965, the SEC
opted for a much faster implementation. The rule would apply
to fiscal years ending on or after December 31, 1965. Catlett had
informed Chief Accountant Barr of his firm’s “deal” with MW,
and he told Barr that if the SEC’s rule were not to take effect until 1966 fiscal-year reports, MW and others in the small minority
of retailers who were classifying the deferred tax liability as current would all switch to noncurrent in their 1965 reports. Catlett
believed that this argument may have been a factor in the SEC’s
30
decision to accelerate the effective date.
THE AFTERMATH OF ACCOUNTING SERIES
RELEASE NO. 102
At the outset of the meeting of the APB on December 8-10,
1965, Chairman Heimbucher handed out confidential copies of
the transcript of the meeting with the SEC and said that, at the
time of the meeting with the SEC, the members of the APB’s
delegation were “certain” that the Commission would proceed
31
to issue its draft release. Heimbucher then quoted from SEC
Chairman Cohen’s remarks during the meeting that the board
is taking much too long to solve the problems before it. Heimbucher was trying to impress on the members that, if the board
29
Publication of the release was reported in “SEC Acts to Make Concerns
More Uniform in Handling of Assets-Liabilities Accounts,” Wall Street Journal,
December 8, 1965, and in “SEC Prods Accountants,” Business Week, January 15,
1966, p. 102.
30
interview with George R. Catlett, dated May 3, 1978
31
AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 2
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did not begin to act more expeditiously, others, such as the SEC,
would fill the void. Following the board’s three-day meeting,
George Catlett reported to his partners that he detected more
of a sense of urgency about achieving constructive and effective
progress than had ever existed since the board’s inception. Not
surprisingly, he said he noticed a degree of resentment toward
AA on the part of some members, yet the salient point was that
the impact on board members of the encounter with the SEC
32
was palpable.
Two members of the APB’s research staff recalled that an
effect of Accounting Series Release No. 102 was that the board
became more careful to include in exposure drafts only those
33
views for which there was strong support.
At a later point in the board’s meeting, some members
thought it would be desirable for the board to state publicly
that it was not in conflict with the SEC over Accounting Series
Release No. 102. The board therefore voted to authorize the administrative director to publish a statement in the Journal of
Accountancy [“SEC Issues Opinion...,” 1966] that it was “in
substantial agreement with the position of the SEC.” Yet the
34
informal vote to do so was 11-5, a bare two-thirds majority.
The statement appeared in the January 1966 issue. While there
apparently were only a few board members who disagreed in
principle with the position espoused in the SEC’s release, other
board members had procedural concerns, including the belief
that the board should not express a view on the classification
question until the research study on current assets and liabilities, and perhaps also that on income tax allocation, were completed.
In April 1966, Kenneth S. Axelson, the financial vice president of J.C. Penney Company and chairman of NRMA’s accounting principles committee, attacked Accounting Series Release No.
102 in a letter to the Journal of Accountancy. He said that the
NRMA had petitioned the SEC to delay the effective date of the
release by three months, but that its petition was denied [Axel35
son, 1966, p. 27].

32
memorandum by George R. Catlett to his partners in AA, dated December
15, 1965
33
interview with Reed K. Storey and Paul Rosenfield, August 1970
34
AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 9
35
Perhaps because of a belief that the retail industry should be better represented on the APB, the Institute’s executive committee appointed Axelson to the
board in 1968.
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In May 1966, Leonard Spacek [1966, p. 381] said in a speech
that “the SEC came to the rescue of professional accountants . . .
while the accounting profession remained in an immobile state
of indecision.” On the other hand, Herman Bevis [1966] criticized the SEC’s release as supporting uniformity of method over
36
genuine comparability in financial reporting.
By coincidence, in early December 1965, AA published a
42-page booklet, Establishing Accounting Principles – A Crisis
in Decision Making, in which it criticized the APB for its in
effectiveness in narrowing the areas of difference in accounting
practice. Copies of the booklet were distributed at the APB’s
meeting on December 8. AA [1965, p. 28] argued in the booklet
that the APB should take steps “to deal with current problems
on a timely basis and carry out its responsibilities in a truly
professional manner.” AA called for the establishment of a U.S.
Court of Accounting Appeals in order to promote the uniformity
of accounting practices prescribed by U.S. federal regulatory
agencies, including the SEC [see “Accounting Court . . . ,” 1966].
At the board’s meeting, Chairman Heimbucher took the time to
quote from SEC Chairman Cohen’s strong remarks during the
hearing as well as from AA’s charge to the APB to improve its
effectiveness. The minutes of the board meeting reported that
“Mr. Heimbucher stated that he quoted from these documents
to emphasize the necessity for action on the part of the Board
in dealing with accounting principles and to stress that, if the
37
Board does not, other groups will assume the responsibility.”
George Catlett, who was a member of the APB from 1965
to 1971, said that the SEC’s release was the event that prompted
the board to begin taking difficult decisions on matters that
would change prevailing practice, and to begin paying more at38
tention to the SEC than to their clients.
For his part, SEC Chairman Cohen [1966, p. 59] sent a
strong message to the APB in a speech in May 1966. He said
that Accounting Series Release No. 102 was an example that
“Stronger leadership by the Commission is one avenue being
followed” in moving toward the goal of uniformity in accounting
practice. He added:
Although Accounting Series Release No. 102 was
used to resolve one problem of uniformity, I do not be36
See also the searing criticism of the release by Theodore Herz [1966], one
of Bevis’ partners.
37
AICPA – APB, minutes of meeting, December 8-10, 1965, p. 3
38
interviews with George R. Catlett, September 3, 1970 and May 3, 1978
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lieve it will be necessary for us to use that device with
great frequency—although the option is always open to
us. The extent to which action on our part is required
will depend in large measure on the vigor and determination of the Accounting Principles Board. . . .
In December 1967, the APB issued Opinion No. 11, “Accounting for Income Taxes,” which, in paragraph 57, explicitly
adopted the SEC’s position in Accounting Series Release No. 102.
The APB really had little option but to do so. Three board members dissented, saying that this treatment “would contribute to
a lack of understanding of working capital, because of the commingling of contingent items with items which are expected to
be realized or discharged during the normal operating cycle of
39
the business.” The Opinion passed by the barest two-thirds majority, 14-6.
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